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My talk today is on place-based jobs policies, by which I mean policies whose proximate goal is 
to boost jobs in particular local labor markets. By boosting jobs in local labor markets, I mean 
boosting jobs in local areas within which there is extensive commuting, such as metropolitan 
areas.  
 
I am going to argue three propositions: 
 
First, we need place-based jobs policies to deal with some significant American labor market 
problems, and specifically the problem of too high non-employment in some local labor markets. 
 
Second, our current place-based policies are wasteful. Our current policies rely too much on 
long-term tax incentives to mega-corporations, and are not targeted in a way that will be very 
cost-effective in solving our labor market problems.  
 
Third, there are better policies that will be more effective in boosting employment rates for all. 
These policies will cut back tax incentives and make them more short-term and better targeted on 
the problem of non-employment in distressed local labor markets. And we should replace most 
tax incentives with infrastructure, business services, and local human capital policies that will be 
more cost-effective in creating job opportunities to boost employment rates. 
 
On the first point, why we need place-based jobs policies. To begin with, we have large 
disparities across local labor markets in employment rates. For example, suppose we look at the 
employment rate, the employment to population ratio, for so-called prime-age workers, ages 25-
54. We look at this for one possible definition of local labor markets, which are commuting 
zones. The U.S. is divided into 709 such commuting zones, comprising groups of counties within 
which there is sufficient commuting that similar workers have similar labor market prospects.  
 
What we find that in the most recent data, even though 10% of the U.S. population lives in  
commuting zones that have prime-age employment rates, or employment to population ratios, as 
great as 84%,  we also have 10% of the U.S population that lives in commuting zones in which 
the employment rate is 9 percentage points lower, at around 75%. 25% of the U.S. population 
lives in commuting zones whose prime-age employment rate is 6 percentage points lower, at 
78%.  
 
Low employment rates have a number of negative social costs, which I’m not going to go into 
the evidence on in this talk. But to sum up, low employment rates lead to lower long-term 
earnings, lower levels of perceived well-being, higher drug and alcohol abuse, higher crime, 
more family break-ups, and poorer outcomes for children raised in such local environments. 
 
If we have too low employment rates in some local labor markets, there are two obvious types of 
solutions: we can move people out of those local labor markets, or we can move jobs into those 




I’m also not going to spend much time on “people to jobs” strategies in this talk. We can talk 
about that more in the question and answer period. I will just sum up by saying that people to 
jobs strategies can’t and won’t work. You can’t get many people to move out of distressed areas 
at an affordable subsidy cost, and getting people to move out hurts those left behind. If you’re 
trying to help Flint, trying to encourage people to move out of Flint is an ineffective and counter-
productive strategy – it won’t get many additional people to move out of Flint, and it certainly 
won’t help those left behind in Flint.   
 
In contrast, “jobs to people” strategies can work. If we increase local employment, it is simply 
mathematically true that either that strategy increases the local employment to population ratio, 
or increases population, or some combination – there’s no other alternative. A new company that 
locates in a metro area may either hire the local employed, the local non-employed, or in-
migrants to the area. But the local employed who are hired result in vacancies that are filled in 
the same three ways. This vacancy chain is only terminated when a job goes to someone local 
who is non-employed, or some in-migrant. Ultimately what matters is the division between 
hiring of local non-employed, and in-migrants, as we go along this vacancy chain.  
 
The remarkable finding from research is that when we increase local jobs, in the long-run this 
increases the local employment rate, the local employment to population ratio, by 20-30% of the 
change in local jobs – the other 70-80% is reflected in higher population. And these effects are 
REALLY long-term. There is clear empirical evidence that these effects occur for 10 years, 20 
years and longer.  
 
As a specific example, consider a study done of the long-term effects of Mississippi’s 1936 
program, Balance Agriculture with Industry. This 1936 program was the original economic 
development incentive program of the modern era; Mississippi enticed northern manufacturers 
with free land and buildings and zero property taxes. A study of this program’s long-term effects 
found that Mississippi counties that attracted manufacturing plants under this program had higher 
labor force participation rates as late as 1960, 24 years after the plants were attracted.    
 
Why do these long-run effects exist? Because of job experience effects. A worker getting extra 
job experience in the short-run increases that worker’s long-run skills, broadly defined – both the 
worker’s hard skills and soft skills, including “skills” such as self-confidence and less problems 
with substance abuse and crime, etc. As a result of what more jobs do in the short-run, local 
residents are more competitive in the labor market in the long-run, and will have higher 
employment rates and earnings.  
 
Now, I want to make two key points about the fact that new local jobs lead 20-30% to higher 
employment rates, 70% to 80% to higher population. 
 
First, one consequence is that the main potential benefit of policies to promote local job growth, 
such as economic development incentives, are labor market benefits, not fiscal benefits. If we’re 
increasing earnings forever by 20 to 30% of the earnings of the new jobs created, the present 




On the other hand, once we take account of the fact that 70% to 80% of the new jobs lead to 
population growth, fiscal benefits of job growth are slight. By “fiscal benefits”, I refer to the 
often made claim that economic development programs, by generating job growth, will help state 
and local government finances by increasing the local tax base. But what this argument 
overlooks is that local growth also increases the needs for expanded public services. With faster 
job growth and population growth, you’re going to have to hire a lot of new school teachers and 
policemen and firemen to serve the additional population. To avoid increased congestion, you’re 
going to have to build a lot of expensive new infrastructure. Economic development policies are 
not a way to make money for the government.  
 
Second, this 20-30% employment rate effect is not a fixed number – it is affected by the local 
economic environment, and by local policy. Distressed local areas will have greater employment 
rate benefits. The percentage of new jobs that go to local residents, compared to in-migrants, is 
roughly two-thirds higher in an economically distressed area, compared to an area that is 
essentially at full employment.  
 
In addition, we can imagine that policies that make it more likely that workers will be hired 
locally will make a difference – such as policies to better match the attracted jobs to the local 
non-employed, or job training policies and job placement policies that help encourage or 
facilitate more hiring of the local non-employed, not just in the firms directly attracted, but in all 
firms along the job vacancy chain. At each point where a firm might hire either locally 
employed, locally non-employed, and in-migrants, we would prefer that more locally non-
employed be hired, if we’re trying to maximize social benefits by increasing employment rates.   
 
So, in debating public policies to promote local job growth, we need to consider that growth is 
not valuable in and of itself. Rather, it is mostly valuable as a means to the end of promoting 
higher local employment rates. So, if all jobs go to in-migrants, there are no local labor market 
benefits, and the policies might have significant fiscal costs. On the other hand, if we are in a 
high-unemployment local labor market and succeed in designing the policies so that more jobs 
go to the non-employed, then the project might have huge labor market benefits.  
 
My second big topic is that our current place-based jobs policies are often wasteful. What are our 
current place-based jobs policies? They are largely state and local business tax incentives. The 
federal government plays a minor role. In addition, relatively few resources are devoted to 
services to business.  
 
Business tax incentives have grown enormously in recent years. Based on an incentives database 
I have constructed for most U.S. states and industries, from 1990 to 2015, they roughly tripled. 
The average incentive today has gone up to be equivalent, over a 20 year period to around 1.5% 
of the business’s value-added, which is roughly 3% of the business’s wage bill. And some recent 
incentive offers raise fears that current incentives may escalate. Wisconsin’s offer to Foxconn 
was over 10 times or great, averaging over 35% of wages over 20 years. Some of the Amazon 
offers were over 12% of wages – New York’s was about 6% of wages.  
 




I should acknowledge that some of the targeting of incentives does make sense. Incentives ARE 
targeted mostly to so-called “tradable” or export-base industries, by which regional economists 
mean more than businesses that sell outside the U.S. – we include any industry that sells outside 
the state. This includes manufacturing industries and some service industries, such as software. 
But it excludes most retail and many service industries, which sell locally.  
 
This targeting makes sense for state and local economic developers– why would you want to 
target the expansion of a local McDonalds’ when any increase in its sales and jobs will just 
reduce sales and jobs in the Burger King down the street?  In contrast, if you target a new auto 
plant in Michigan, it might reduce jobs at an auto plant in Ohio, but that’s not Michigan’s 
problem. And the new auto jobs in Michigan will have some positive multiplier effects on 
Michigan jobs in auto suppliers, and in retailers responding to the increased demand from 
additional auto workers.  So, it makes sense to target manufacturers, whose multiplier might be 
2, versus fast food restaurants, whose multiplier might be zero.  
 
On the other hand, WITHIN “tradable” industries, incentives are not really targeted in any 
logical way. In my analysis of my incentives database, there is virtually no correlation between 
an industry’s incentives and its wages. And high-tech industries don’t receive more incentives 
than others.  
 
In addition, the evidence strongly suggests that within tradable industries, incentives are strongly 
targeted on big business. Firms with over 100 employees get over 90% of incentives, even 
though they constitute just two-thirds of private jobs. And although there is no data on this, I 
suspect the situation is worse than that – my guess is that the approximately 1,500 U.S. firms 
with over 10,000 U.S. employees get over half of all tax incentives.  
 
Incentives are not targeted much geographically. Indiana’s incentives are twice as great as 
Illinois’s, even though the two states have very similar employment rates. South Carolina’s 
incentives are twice those of North Carolina, even though these two neighbors again have very 
similar employment rate. And within states, there doesn’t appear to be too much targeting of 
incentives on distressed areas.  
 
Incentives are also excessively long-term. The average incentive package in the U.S. starts out 
very high in the first year, goes down by about half in the second year, but then continues at that 
high level through 10 years after the investment decision is made. Some states have incentives 
that go even longer, for example in both the New York and Virginia Amazon deals, and the 
Wisconsin Foxconn deals. But long-term incentives don’t make economic sense – business 
executives in making investment decisions heavily discount the future. It’s hard to believe that 
the incentive provided in year 10 really has any effect whatsoever on location decisions today.  
 
There is a political logic to how incentives are designed. Incentives are popular with the public—
the public likes it if a governor or mayor tries to “do something” about jobs. “At least he’s 
trying” – that seems to be the attitude. And to maximize media attention and voter support, it 
makes sense to target the big fish mega-corporation with big incentives.  If a governor or mayor 
wants to minimize the incentive costs he has to deal with, he tries to push a higher proportion of 
incentive costs off onto the next governor or mayor, and make it HIS budget problem. And why 
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target high-wage industries or distressed areas – it’s politically easier to just spread the incentive 
love as widely as possible.  
 
But my most important point is that incentives are often wasteful because they don’t affect many 
location or expansion decisions. Incentives are of modest size compared to overall business costs 
– as I said, they average 3% of wages. A 3% of wages subsidy is not going to tip many location 
decisions from some other state to this state. The research literature on how sensitive business 
location decisions are to taxes suggests that average incentives might tip around 10-15% of 
location decisions. In other words, at least 85% of the time, incentives are simply all cost, no 
benefit. Or to put it another way, if the incentive had NOT been provided, 85% as many jobs 
would have been created anyway.  
 
Now, there always are uncertainties in research. Maybe incentives of 3% of wages tip more than 
10-15% of location decisions – maybe it’s 25%. Or maybe it’s only 5%. There’s some 
uncertainty. But one thing I’m sure of – it’s very misleading to analyze the benefits and costs of 
incentives under the assumption that anything that is touched by an incentive is induced by the 
incentive, that is by assuming that the “but for” is 100%.  
 
That brings me to my third point. There would be great social benefits from reallocating some 
jobs to distressed areas, that is areas have too low employment rates.  Such a job reallocation 
would help increase overall U.S. employment rates. Is there a way of accomplishing this 
reallocation that is less wasteful than the current design of business tax incentives?  
 
First, we should reform incentives so that they are targeted more at distressed areas. Tax 
incentives should be greater in states with lower employment rates. And within states, tax 
incentives should be targeted at areas with lower employment rates. North Carolina is one model 
– North Carolina for a long time has had incentives vary by three tiers of North Carolina 
counties, based on each county’s economic status. 
 
Incentives currently are as likely to hurt distressed areas as to help them. That needs to change.  
 
Second, incentives should be upfront. They should be payable in the first year of the location or 
expansion decision, or the first three years, and not carried forward into the next governor or 
mayor’s term of office. To limit excesses, I would suggest incentives should be limited to the 
company’s income tax and property tax liability on its first three years of operations. This would 
average about $20K per job in the U.S. And the credits should be non-refundable, and not be 
able to be carried forward after 3 years. 
 
$20K per job would be about what Virginia, a below-average incentive state, offered Amazon in 
tax incentives, although they offered it over a long time. And it’s about one-fourth of what New 
York offered Amazon, although again they offered it over a long time. And it’s about one half of 
the average tax incentive package in U.S.  
 
Third, we should pursue incentives more though other policies that might be more cost-effective. 
I’ve argued before that customized business services to small and medium sized businesses 
might create jobs at one-tenth the cost of average incentives. What kind of services? The services 
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for which there is the best evidence of effectiveness are manufacturing extension services and 
customized job training.  
 
Manufacturing extension services are partially federally funded. Each state has one or more 
manufacturing extension office. Manufacturing extension service provide small and medium size 
manufacturers with advice, either directly from the office, or they broker advice from local 
university faculty or private consultants. The advice provided to these smaller manufacturers is 
on a wide variety of topics, including new production technologies, business software, finding 
new markets, personnel policies, etc.  
 
Customized job training is where states agree to pay part or all of the cost of training new or 
incumbent workers to a firm’s specific job requirements, with the training typically provided 
through local community colleges. The training is frequently part of a package provided to entice 
a new firm location decision, encourage an expansion, or help retain jobs threatened by foreign 
competition.  
 
Without getting into the weeds of evaluation studies, there is some good evaluation evidence on 
manufacturing extension services and customized job training from quasi-experiment studies that 
compare assisted firms with similar unassisted firms. This research suggests that manufacturing 
extension and customized job training are cost-effective in helping reduce business costs and 
spur job growth.  
 
There also is good evidence that some regional efforts to boost infrastructure, such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Appalachian Regional Commission, have been cost-
effective.  For example, TVA seems to have permanently boosted manufacturing jobs in the 
TVA region, compared to otherwise similar regions, and by a large amount compared to the 
federal investment in TVA. The estimated cost per job created is less than one-fifth of that for 
business tax incentives.  
 
The Empowerment Zone program of the late 1990s, at least in its original form, also seems to 
have been relatively effective, comparing the very large neighborhoods assisted by the program 
with similar unassisted large neighborhoods in other cities. This Empowerment Zone program 
combined subsidies for hiring residents of distressed neighborhoods, with various job training 
service and business services in these neighborhoods. Empowerment Zones seem to have been 
far more effective than state enterprise zone programs. Why the difference? That’s unclear, but it 
could be that most state enterprise zone programs just provide tax breaks, whereas 
Empowerment Zones also provided some services to help businesses and increase job skills in 
the assisted neighborhood.  
 
Finally, I know of one study of brownfields that finds high cost-effectiveness. However, this 
study is a before and after comparison, so I would tend to regard this evidence as weaker than for 
the other programs.  
 
Now an interesting philosophical question is WHY these various customized business services 
and infrastructure and land development policies tend to often be more cost-effective than simply 
subsidizing job growth through business tax incentives. I think the main reason is that these 
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business services and infrastructure services and land development policies directly deal with the 
problems that impede job growth in an area, by providing high-quality inputs to business 
production at a cost less than their value to assisted businesses. In contrast, business tax 
incentives simply provide temporary subsidies that don’t really fundamentally change the 
competitiveness of the area for job growth. A lot of what gets subsidized would have occurred 
anyway. It’s easier to just hand out cash via business tax incentives than it is to provide valuable 
public services, but providing high-value public services is more cost-effective if you spend the 
time to figure out how to do it.  
 
Fourth, I think we should be continually experimenting with ways to encourage more local hiring 
of the unemployed. This can be done in part with well-run customized training programs. This 
could also be done in part with tying some tax incentives for job creation to hiring the long-term 
unemployed.  
 
Now the big problem with tying tax incentives to hiring the long-term unemployed is stigma 
effects. There is a famous experiment in which welfare recipients were randomly assigned to a 
treatment group that was instructed to go out and tell potential employers that they would get a 
wage subsidy for hiring them. And the welfare recipients who did so ended up being less likely 
to be hired, presumably because many employers had a bias against hiring welfare recipients.  
 
But there are ways of overcoming stigma effects. Minnesota had an economic development 
program in the 1980s, the Minnesota Employment and Economic Development Program or 
MEED, which offered wage subsidies for hiring the long-term unemployed for new jobs – but 
the wage subsidies were not an entitlement, but rather were discretionary subsidies that were 
controlled by local workforce agencies. The local workforce agencies screened the long-term 
unemployed, and in some cases provided some training. They then carefully marketed these 
clients to local employers who they thought would be more willing to take a risk on someone 
who has been unemployed long-term, and less likely to stigmatize them. There is survey 
evidence that the program was successful, but no rigorous evidence. We need to do some more 
rigorous experiments with programs of this type. As I already mentioned, anything we can do to 
encourage more local hiring to be from the local non-employed will help make growth more 
inclusive, by helping get more new jobs to raise the local employment rate, rather than simply 
boosting in-migration.  
 
I also want to mention that the Upjohn Institute is running some innovative employment 
programs in Southwest Michigan. The Upjohn Institute has since the early 1970s been the 
administrative agent for federally-funded and state-funded workforce programs in Kalamazoo 
County and nearby counties. Recently, as part of our work running these workforce programs, 
which go under the name Michigan Works, we have been trying out some new ways of linking 
the non-employed to jobs. These include a program called Neighborhood Employment hubs, in 
which we bring employment counselors and job developers into neighborhood centers, churches 
and other trusted organizations in low-income neighborhoods. These include another program 
called Employer Resource Networks in which a consortium of employers pays for Michigan 
Works staff to provide “success coaches” to help overcome problems that might impede job 
retention for new hires. We don’t know yet whether these program approaches have a large 




We pay a lot of money trying to increase job growth in local areas. We should be willing to pay 
some money to experiment, to see if we can do better at increasing access to these new jobs by 
the non-employed.  Ultimately, such benefits for the non-employed are the only good rationale 
for large subsidies to creating new jobs in local area.  
 
To finish up by summarizing my main message: Place-based jobs policies should be considered a 
key component of overall U.S. labor market policy. Its role within overall U.S. labor market 
policy is to deal with the special social and economic problems caused by geographic disparities 
in employment rates. But for these programs to make the most sense, they not only need to target 
distressed areas with low employment rates, but they need to be designed so they are more cost-
effective, both in creating new jobs, and in directing those new jobs to the non-employed. This 
can be done with scaled back upfront tax incentives, business services, and infrastructure and 
land development programs. And these programs will be more effective in raising employment 
rates if we coordinate these place-based jobs programs with innovative local workforce programs 
that do a better job of linking the non-employed with jobs. Taking place-based jobs policies 
seriously as a labor market policy requires both significant investments, and significant reforms 
of current incentive policies.  
 
  
 
 
